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Abstract
Wagstaff, William Andrew. M.A. The University of Memphis. May/2013. Why
Nations Succeed: The Society and the State. Major Professor: Matthias Kaelberer.
The state is essential to economic development because it provides the framework
within which such development can either falter or flourish. Unfortunately, much of the
empirical work on the subject is very limited in scope and the theory too amorphous. The
case studies usually do not analyze trends prior to the state’s colonial experience nor do
they identify key variables, but rather incorporate many details without explaining their
significance. This study aims to help fill these gaps by including the role of society.
Utilizing China, I am able to trace the impact of the state and society upon economic
development many hundreds of years prior to colonialism through a “within-case”
analysis and then across cases through regression models. Ultimately, this study will
hone current theories surrounding the state’s and society’s roles in economic
development and provide more concrete direction for future research.
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Chapter 1
A Tenuous Relationship1
China’s latest spurt of economic growth has garnered a lot of attention from
academics and non-academics alike. It also presents an interesting puzzle for economic
development theory as it eschews common (i.e. liberal) development thought that is so
often espoused by Western institutions. China’s statist approach has renewed interest in
the role of the state in fostering economic development. Effective economic
development requires an efficacious state – that much is obvious. Even a cursory look at
the globe reveals that effective economic development occurs almost always in areas that
have stable and efficacious states. Many studies have either explicitly or implicitly begun
with this proposition (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Besley and Persson, 2011; Vu,
2010; Kohli, 2004; 1986; Reinert, 1999; Brohman, 1996). Efficacious states, however,
are only necessary for economic development, not sufficient.
Some states that do appear to have the ability to govern somehow still fail to
develop to their full potential. The question then becomes, among those efficacious
states, what separates those that successfully develop from those that do not? This
question requires an analysis of not only the state, but also of the society that it governs
(Chibber, 2003). Such an approach requires that I distinguish economic development
from mere wealth extraction, which is sometimes mistaken for economic development.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

The inspiration for this project, and the title, comes from Acemoglu and Robinson’s
(2012) book, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. In this paper I
adopt their distinction between extractive economic institutions, in which the state is the sole
beneficiary of industry, and inclusive economic institutions, which provide a fair compensation
for labor so that society generally can enjoy the benefits of the greater wealth. As an aside, I wish
to clarify that I am not investigating the success of nations in the ethnic sense, but rather that
success of the state as a political, territorial entity. Furthermore, this study views the state as a
unitary actor though the author acknowledges that this a simplification from the reality.
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Often this is due to the economic growth that can occur as a result of extractive policies.
As I will show, state elites (referred to here as “the state”) fundamentally desire wealth,
the simple accumulation of money, as opposed to economic development. Economic
development entails a shift from extractive economic institutions, such as a centrally
planned economy that dictates the economic activity of the society with the goal of
accumulating wealth, to inclusive economic institutions, which provides economic
freedom to the society and spreads the benefits of economic growth through as large a
section of the society as possible rather than concentrate it in the hands of the state elites.
The collectivization of the peasants in China under Mao Zedong beginning in the 1950’s
provides a good example of extractive economic institutions. Capitalist institutions
wherein citizens can invest, move capital, and work however they choose provides a
good example of an inclusive economic institutions. In this formulation societal pressure,
in the context of an efficacious state, holds the key to economic development, which in
turn holds the key to sustained economic growth.2
Simply stated, the central thesis of this project is as follows: states will pursue
wealth by extractive means until society forces the state to move towards inclusive
economic institutions either through constant pressure upon the state or through
revolution. This is due to the state elites’ desire to remain in power.3 The more the
society can exploit this vulnerability, the more it can leverage against the state.
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) find that it is crucial for states to make the transition to
inclusive political and economic institutions in order sustain long-term economic growth. They
fail, however, to provide a convincing explanation for shifting to and from inclusive institutions
in the first place.
3

Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (2003) share this assumption in their construction of
a convincing game theoretic model that has wide ranging implications domestically (e.g. what
causes bad policy) and internationally (e.g. the underlying causes of the Democratic Peace
Theory).
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Ultimately, the state is willing to concede ground that reduces the state’s ability to extract
wealth only if the alternative is to lose power completely.
The driving force for economic development in this formulation lays in the
incentive structures of the state and the society which it governs as well as their relative
power. As previously stated, it has been well established in the literature that an effective
and centralized state is an important precondition for economic development. However,
state centralization is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for economic development
– it is only sufficient for wealth extraction. Incentive structures provide the sufficient
conditions. This is not to say that incentive structures necessarily need to explicitly
promote economic development in order to ultimately result in such an outcome. For
example, a state may create an effective and powerful apparatus in order to extract
wealth. While a problematic arrangement for long-term growth (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012), such extractive institutions have the potential to foster the economic
growth that can set the stage for later economic development. For instance, Mao Zedong
inflicted a lot of damage to Chinese society, but left an efficacious state4 that not only had
the ability create policy (leaving aside the desirability of his policies), but could also
mobilize society to conform to that policy. Such a state served China well once Deng
Xiaoping came into power and helped to foster China’s subsequent economic
development – however limited. Additionally, extractive policies typically foment
dissent within society.5 This dissent can mobilize the society to push for inclusive
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4

Vivienne Shue (1994) rightly points out that by the end Mao’s tenure, China’s ability to
mobilize the masses had waned. Nevertheless, the state had considerably more power at the end
of his tenure than at the beginning and Deng Xiaoping managed to reconsolidate his hold on the
society by making a few concessions without significantly compromising the state’s power.
5

Just look at Vietnam, China, or South Africa today for examples.
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economic institutions. In this way, extractive institutions are a precursor to inclusive
institutions.

Table 1: Key Terms
Term

Definition

Example(s)

State

The sovereign governing
apparatus of a given territory not
subject to any other external
international authority

(1) The United States of
America Federal Government
(2) The People’s Republic of
China Government in Beijing

Society

The group of people that the are
subject to the policies of the
government

(1) The citizens of the United
States of America
(2) The citizens of Nigeria

Extractive
Economic
Institutions

Economic institutions designed
and run by the state for the
purpose of accumulating wealth
for the state

Economic central planning
and collectivization under
Mao Zedong in the 1940’s,
50’s, and 60’s

Inclusive
Economic
Institutions

Provides the society with the
economic freedom to choose and
directly benefit from their own
economic activity

Capitalist economic
institutions found in much of
the Western world

The shift from extractive to
inclusive economic institutions

The market reforms
implemented in China after
Mao Zedong died that enabled
greater economic freedom for
the citizens of China.

Economic
Development

This approach to analyzing the causes of economic development has a number of
important benefits. First, previous studies have gone to great lengths to show that
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political and economic institutions have important consequences for economic
development. None, however, have satisfactorily explained why such development
occurs in the first place, especially given the incentives for wealth extraction that drive
state behavior, as I will more fully explain later. By analyzing the society, this study
shows that the initiate conditions for economic development lie within the desire of the
society for inclusive economic institutions. Second, my approach will be able to account
for variations in economic development by incorporating the relative power relationship
between the state and society. This assertion requires substantial theoretical foundation
and so will only be made explicit after discussing the opposing incentive structures that
influence the state and society. Simply put, the degree to which the society can leverage
against the state determines the degree to which inclusive economic institutions will
develop. The greater the leverage the more fully such inclusive institutions will emerge.
Third, differentiating between wealth accumulation and economic development
helps to clarify economic development as well as incorporate the social and political
dimensions of development. Wealth accumulation cares nothing for social and political
development and is, in fact, often detrimental to those processes. Analyzing economic
development, defined as the shift towards economic freedom and maturity, helps to speak
to the concomitant social and political development occurring at the same time. Thus,
economic development can be more directly linked to the modernization project
generally. This ability enables this project to speak to the debate concerning the
relationship between social, political, and economic development, such as how they are
related and whether any are a prerequisite for the others - an important issue raised by
Samuel Huntington (1968) that is still a source of debate. Differentiating between the
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social, political, and economic development, while analytically useful, obscures the
degree to which they are intertwined.
To better understand the problem at hand, I will next examine the composition,
goals, and means of exerting influence available to the state and society. Their goals
create incentive structures that condition their behavior. Generally speaking, these
actors’ goals are in conflict. Thus, what matters most is the relative power distribution of
each actor. The vast state-centric economic development literature will enable me to
readily identify some of the key sources of state power. The literature on economic
development, unfortunately, has not explicitly paid as much attention to the role of
society and so I must rely on other fields for my investigation. Identifying the salient
features that affect both state and societal power will greatly aid my later analysis by
identifying key areas upon which to focus.
The State and Its Power
This discussion of the state will begin with perhaps the most famous formulation
of a state. According to Max Weber:
…a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state.
Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is
ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to
which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the
‘right’ to use violence (2007: 78).

The distinction about the legitimate use of force is an important one to remember. This
definition does not preclude other violence from occurring within said territory. Indeed,
many states have had or are currently experiencing widespread violence within their
borders, but the key difference is that the state’s use of force is recognized as legitimate
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and that it has the means to at least control non-state violence within its borders (Waltz,
1979). This monopoly on violence has important uses.
The state uses this monopoly to enforce property rights and extract revenue,
which are key ingredients for economic development (North, 1981; Levi, 1988).
Revenue extraction can occur under both extractive economic institutions through the
direct coercive intervention of the state and inclusive economic institutions through the
use of effective and reasonable taxation. The state, in the absence of societal restraints,
will constantly pursue revenue extraction through extractive economic institutions.
Property rights enforcement really only becomes relevant once society has gained enough
power to create inclusive institutions. These inclusive institutions, however, still require
sufficient state power to enforce their inclusive policies. Thus an interesting dilemma
emerges. The society needs the state to be powerful enough to enforce inclusive
institutions. This power becomes problematic, however, if the state is not compelled by
society to use it for inclusive policies. For example, the United States has a lot of power,
but it is generally used to promote inclusive policies since the state is beholden to the
society it governs.
Defining the state in terms of an enforcing mechanism enables me to trace it
through time despite its evolving particulars. The state apparatus will be that which
maintains the law and order in a given territory. In areas with rampant violence that
cannot be controlled by the state, then both the state and society in that area are greatly
weakened and the state approaches a “failed state” status.6 This points out another
interesting state-society relationship. An effectively functioning society requires an
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Failed states are those states that no longer have the ability to govern their territory and
are typically characterized by rampant demographic issues and violence.
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effective state, but only insofar as the state does not oppress the society. The initial
condition of the state-society relationship will be that the state extracts from society, but
the ideal relationship involves a state characterized by inclusive economic institutions
that provide the framework for the society to flourish and develop. Now that I have
established what I mean by the state, I will discuss the goals of the state.
The state desires two things: first, to secure its position in the international
system, and second, to secure its hold on power domestically. The state is worried about
both internal and external issues (Sachs, 2012). Wealth is a necessary prerequisite for
international security and so the state tries to extract as much wealth from society as it
can (Bratton, 1994). In an anarchical international system, it is important for the state to
have a strong economy insofar as a strong economy promotes a strong military
(Mearsheimer, 2001). A strong military is a prerequisite for security and survival (Waltz,
1954; 1979). This desire to be more powerful and secure, or at least better off, generally
permeates international relations theory.7 This international reality, coupled with the
elite’s desire to remain in power, provide compelling incentives to the state to extract
wealth from society. Wealth extraction provides the state with the necessary revenue to
secure its borders, or even expand. In short, more revenue means that the state can
become more powerful. Domestically, the state extracts wealth to perpetuate its rule and
run itself. In some cases, though, society may have sufficient leverage to curb the state’s
extractive policies. Before moving on to the society, however, I will first identify the key
aspects of the state and how it exerts influence. Doing so will provide analytical clarity
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Though not always explicitly addressed, most of the theoretical literature in
international relations revolves around how the state can best secure itself either through selfreliance or how to resolve collective action problems in order to cooperate – whether through
international institutions, changing discourses, or some other means.
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when seeking not only to measure the power of the state, but also delineate it from the
society. State power can be divided into two categories: soft power8 and hard power.
Soft power in this context refers to the legitimacy of the state. The state’s
legitimacy directly impacts the society’s willingness to obey the state in the absence of
force. The greater the state’s legitimacy, the more willingly society will obey the state;
the converse is also true. Previous studies have confirmed the importance of the state’s
legitimacy in fostering economic growth. In Nigeria, for example, the state failed to
centralize legitimate authority in the state, the results of which are easy to see to this day
(Kohli, 2004). It is thus crucial for the state to bolster its legitimacy to ensure its political
survival and efficacy.
States can bolster their legitimacy through a variety of means. Gerschenkron
(1962) observes that the Soviet Union’s state managed to maintain its hold on power,
despite its unpopularity among the society, by spreading the notion that the Soviet state
provided a crucial function in ensuring the society’s economic well being. It sought to
emphasize the necessity of industrialization and pointed towards a bright future. Selling
this story to the society helped legitimize Communist rule and perpetuated societal
support for the Communist state. Authoritarian regimes in particular must actively
confront the problem of legitimization due to the relative deprivation society suffers
under such regimes.
Authoritarian states typically deprive their citizens of voting, free speech, and free
press. Some citizens, though, may benefit from the state’s extractive policies even if they
are not included in the state itself. China provides an important example of this. Many
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While on the surface, this conception of soft power holds many similarities to that of
Joseph Nye’s, soft power in this case is projected inward toward the state’s society while Nye’s is
projected outward towards other states.
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people in China are benefiting from China’s economic growth despite the absence of
economic development. Such people may be happy with the current state of affairs. The
vast majority, however, suffer greatly under China’s extractive policies and protest, often
violently (Moore, 2009). Pervasive state corruption exacerbates the society’s qualms.
Corruption undermines the society’s faith in the state, increasing the probability of
disobedience and protest. These protests become particularly dangerous if they organize
around a central goal in opposition to the state, such as inclusive political and economic
institutions.
In order to bolster their legitimacy, states – specifically authoritarian states – have
a number of tools at their disposal. White (1986) points out four strategies: (1)
implementing superficial elections, (2) “political incorporation” where the state allows
the dissenting sections of society to join the state in order to silence them, (3)
“associational incorporation” where the state subsumes the most vocal organizations in
order to silence them, and (4) allowing and publishing critical letters in media outlets
such as the state newspapers. Indonesian presidential elections under president Suharto
in the 1970s provide an example of the first strategy (Liddle, 1973), as do Chinese
elections today. In addition to these four strategies, ideology can play an important role
in legitimizing the state’s rule.
Ideology often takes the form of nationalism. Kohli (2004) observes that
nationalism can help the state’s ability to mobilize labor, while the lack of it can impede
such efforts. For example, Brazil’s “shallow nationalism” after World War Two
hampered the state’s ability to organize and mobilize labor, which subsequently harmed
economic growth. The state can help foster nationalism, but it often requires a “national
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crucible” (Kohli, 2004: 334). National crucibles involve existential crises that pose a
threat to both the state and society that forces both to unite under a common banner, such
as a foreign invasion or resisting colonizers. Nigeria, for example, never experienced
such a national crucible, which made it difficult to find a foundation upon which
nationalism could form. China, on the other had, has experienced a large number of
national crucibles around which a robust nationalist sentiment has formed (Vu, 2010).
Often, however, the state must be careful when creating nationalist sentiment as it could
make it difficult to change course later if necessary.
Hard power has a comparatively greater impact on state power than soft power.
The state’s hard power has a number of different manifestations, the most important of
which are the military and police forces. These forces provide the state with the ability to
compel the society in the event of disobedience and protest. Brohman (1996) has
observed that the NICs in East Asia committed a multitude of human rights abuses
against their populations, particularly against women. Such abuses foment dissention.
This makes effective military and police forces essential for the state to maintain its
exclusive hold on power and continue extracting wealth.
Huntington does a great job of succinctly identifying the key characteristics of a
military force: “A modern military establishment includes a standing army recruited
voluntarily or through conscription and commanded by a professional officer corps”
(1968: 120). Such a definition identifies the need for not just quantity, but also quality.
The military must be highly organized and loyal to be an effective state tool. A highly
politicized officer corps can create issues for state control, such as what happened in
Brazil’s officer corps following World War II. Such politicization hurt the central
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Brazilian state’s ability to push economic growth policies in every province.9 Nigeria
provides another example of how a state without an effective military force fails to grow
economically or develop politically.10
The police forces of developing countries aid the state’s enforcement of policies
by searching for infractions and punishing the violators. The KCIA served such a
function in South Korea, as did the secret police in Taiwan (Kohli, 2004; Brohman,
1996). Both the military and police forces are crucial factors in the state’s ability to
ensure its continued rule through extractive institutions. As society coalesces on
economic development issues, the state requires more and more power to maintain
control. However, once “critical junctures”11 have been crossed, society will seek to
throw off the state’s shackles. Such instances occurred during the Glorious Revolution
and the French Revolution (identified as “critical junctures” in history by Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012).
One final consideration that greatly impacts both the hard and soft sources of the
state’s power concerns the political cohesiveness of the ruling faction. When the state
cannot agree on particular policies, factions begin to form that negatively impact the
state’s ability to create coherent policies. Such an observation extends to single-party
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Those provinces with a highly politicized officer corps more often refused to follow the
central states policies. Since the officer corps controlled the coercive means of the state, the state
was unable to force those officers into submission.
10

Nigeria’s military problems stemmed from the “Neo-patrimonial,” to use Kohli’s
(2004) terminology, characteristics of the state. More to the point, the rampant corruption among
Nigeria’s political elites affected the military as well. The military used as a weapon against the
development of the state rather than a tool for development.
11

To use Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) terminology, though our meanings are not
necessarily the same. “Critical junctures” here refer to certain conditions in the state-society
balance of power relationship. They occur once the society gains sufficient power to violently
threaten the state and yet the state continues to refuse compromise. The only alternative left to
the society in such instances is revolution.

12	
  

	
  

rule as well as multi-party rule. As Arend Lijphart observes, “it is generally wrong to
view political parties as ‘unitary actors’” (1999: 72). While Lijphart’s statement refers to
democracies, it can just as easily apply to single-party states. Simply consider the
extensive fighting within the Chinese Communist Party throughout 2012 (Wines, 2012).
When such divisions occur, particularly when they are on display, they severely weaken
the state’s ability to control its own sources of power and negatively impact its standing
with the society, which has its own sources of power.
The Society and Its Power
When talking about a country’s society it is important to remember that the
society is composed of many different interest groups (Vitalis, 1994). In developing
states, though, the society may coalesce around an issue area that directly relates to the
economy. Vietnam, for example, is experiencing frequent worker strikes as workers in
Vietnam fight for living wages (Bland, 2012). Such strikes present a political challenge
to the ruling Communist Party. Wealth extraction, and economic development generally,
has had severe social consequences even in countries that are now very stable. During
their major growth periods the societies of South Korea and Singapore suffered many
human rights violations at the hands the state (Kohli, 2004). Indeed, in many developing
states, social development suffers in the name of “economic development,” which really
serves as a euphemism for wealth extraction. While this project is mostly concerned with
political and economic development, social development has important consequences for
shaping the incentive structures of the society. To illustrate, imagine a society that
suffers under extractive economic institutions. Repression under such institutions
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provides incentives to the society to disobey, or even revolt, and thus increases the
society’s cohesiveness and power.
Merely desiring to disobey or revolt is not enough to affect change though;
society must also have enough power to be a credible threat to the state. The society is
not a credible threat until it has enough power to remove the ruling faction. This can be
either through election or revolution. In such cases, the state is then faced with two
options: negotiate or lose power. The ability of society to influence the state depends
upon the power distribution in the state-society relationship (Migdal, 1994). It should be
noted that the society need not be more powerful than the state to affect change, but only
powerful enough to be the credible threat just described. Often, power is based upon
society’s ability to form cohesive groups that push for economic development.
There are two major economic divisions of society: labor and business, and my
distinction here closely approximates Marx’s proletariat and bourgeoisie.12 Labor refers
to the segment of society that works without actually owning the product of their labor.
They typically work in manufacturing. Business refers to the segment of society that
own the capital of production as well as the product of the labor’s efforts. Labor’s and
business’ ability to organize and cooperate have important implications for society’s
ability to leverage against the state. Labor groups can coalesce in opposition to extractive
state policies, such as demanding better pay or better work conditions. While these are
normatively desirable things, they may have a negative impact on the state’s economic
growth and, thus, will put the society at odds with the state (Kohli, 2004). Importantly,
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It would be prudent to note here that while my definition of labor and business
approximates Marx’s division of classes, I do not necessarily share his views concerning class
conflict and the end of capitalism. On the contrary, capitalism often provides the foundation
upon which inclusive economic institutions are designed.

14	
  

	
  

large numbers of disaffected working class citizens or peasants can pose serious problems
for the state, particularly if they are young and unemployed (Moore, 1966; Huntington,
1968; Schuman, 2012). With nothing else to do, this demographic has ample time and
opportunity to organize against the state. The more organized this mass becomes the less
the state can control it (Barkey and Parikh, 1991). The tactics these groups use depend
upon the willingness of the state to concede to their demands, which in turn depends upon
the state’s vulnerability to the society. If, however, the state refuses to concede even
when the society does pose a credible threat, violence will result.
Business interests can also have a profound impact on the state’s policies because
they have a greater ability to control the movement of wealth in a country. Business
interests tend to conflict with labor interests because businesses desire, first and foremost,
profit. Providing better pay or work conditions for workers tends to hurt profit,
particularly in developing countries where low wages and fewer regulations help attract
foreign investment. When business interests align with labor interests, however, they can
together exert considerable influence. For example, business groups in India over the
past few decades have managed to restrain India’s economic growth (as the state sought
economic growth through import-substitution industrialization) because businesses feared
the negative consequences such policies might have on profit. In South Korea under the
Park regime, on the other hand, the state leaders implemented development policies
(export-led industrialization) that served the interests of the state as well as the business
interests and, subsequently, had far greater growth, and later developmental, success
(Chibber, 2003). These cases illustrate why it is important for businesses to favor
inclusive institutions – they provide powerful leverage against the state.
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In some cases, though, business interests prefer the extractive institutions. For
example, if the state hopes to develop a certain sector in order to optimize wealth
extraction, then businesses in that sector may benefit greatly from increased state
investment. Such structures may also allow nascent industries to secure favorable
business deals by exploiting corruption (Moran, 1999). In these instances it would make
little sense for business to want to fundamentally change the state’s economic
institutions. Such an observation implies that states need to satisfy the dominant business
interests of society to prevent business and labor from aligning against the state.
Furthermore, in some cases business belongs to the state. Examples abound, simply look
to China’s Sinopec Petroleum or Russia’s Gazprom. In such cases where business
interests align closely with state interests, the burden falls to labor to drive economic
development in the face of opposition from both business and the state.
It is worth taking the time here to speak to the international sources of social
power. While the domestic sources of power discussed above are more explicit,
international forces can also have a profound effect. A society in an undeveloped country
that is cut off from the rest of the world likely does not know of the economic policies of
other countries. Without understanding what alternatives exist, the society may never
coalesce on a particular grievance. The most striking example of this is North Korea – a
country largely cut off from international interaction. The point here, simply, is that
North Korea has largely managed to stay undeveloped for a couple of reasons. The first
is the major state apparatus that controls the country. The second is that the society does
not have much exposure to alternative political and economic systems. I will pick up this
discussion again at the end of chapter two and in chapter three.
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Table 2: Key Actors
Actor

Preferred Type of Economic
Institutions

Sources of Power

State

Extractive Economic Institutions

Military and Police Forces as
a proportion of the population

Inclusive Economic Institutions

Harder to define, but can
include such things as ability
to communicate and organize,
as well as level of discontent

Society

The State and Society: A Tenuous Relationship
Where the desires of the state and society clash, an asymmetry in power will
result in a “winner.” The larger the asymmetry, the greater the “win.” On the other hand,
symmetry of power will result in prolonged internal conflict. State power is a direct
function of its ability to impose its will upon society. Given the variety of state-society
power distributions within an asymmetric balance of power, one of three results will
occur: the state will dominate the society, society controls the state, or there will be a
compromise through which the state slowly accommodates the society’s interests
(Migdal, 1994). Alternatively, a symmetry of power in which society overestimates its
power will result in a stalemate that has the potential to explode in violence. Only when
the society dominates the state will full economic development occur. In the case of a
compromise, economic development will be limited; and in the event of state domination
there will only be extractive institutions and a complete lack of economic development.
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A stalemate that turns violent will likewise result in extractive institutions as the state
tries to regain control. Additionally, such violence can leave a wake of destruction that
impedes economic development and growth in the long-term. As Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012) observe, wealth will accumulate under extractive institutions, and
society may even see some of these benefits. Such growth, however, will not last unless
inclusive political institutions develop, which then provide the foundation for inclusive
economic institutions such as those that characterize the “developed” world. In their
analysis, China provides a compelling, and foreboding, example. China has attracted a
lot of attention around the world for its near-miraculous economic growth despite the fact
that it eschews the so-called “Washington Consensus,” which dictates free market growth
as the expense of state intervention (Stiglitz, 2006). China has instead continued along its
growth path by utilizing a mixture of extractive and inclusive economic institutions with
a large amount of state intervention. Such a “state-capitalist” model has attracted the
attention of other states, such as Russia, which have also adopted a similar approach
(Kupchan, 2012). Due to this development model’s growing popularity some scholars
have begun to term it the “Beijing Consensus” (Arrighi, 2008). Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) warn, however, that China’s economy will eventually come to ruin if it does not
transition to inclusive political and economic institutions.

Table 3: Simplified Model
Source of Economic Development (in order of event)
State Power ßà Creates Infrastructure à Social Power à Economic Development
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have already made great progress on analyzing
how states shift from extractive institutions to inclusive institutions. They have even
tangentially tackled the idea of incentives in fostering economic growth, but from an
institutional point of view. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), institutions, specifically
inclusive economic institutions, foster economic growth by creating the incentives for the
society to produce. The main problem with this assertion is that the society already had
incentives to work towards economic growth under extractive institutions. The
difference is that inclusive economic institutions provide positive incentives for economic
growth, such as earning a higher wage for better work or getting to keep the rights to
intellectual property, while the extractive economic institutions provide negative
incentives, such as work or be punished by the state apparatus. While one is normatively
more desirable than the other, incentives for the society to produce exist under both
institutions.
An additional problem is the way that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) try to
explain the shift from extractive to inclusive economic institutions. While recognizing
the inherent conflict between the state elite and those that are subject to them, they leave
some important questions unanswered. For example, when discussing how revolutions
cause inclusive economic institutions to arise, they remain silent on the issue of why.
Simply because an oppressed population throws off an oppressive state does not mean
that they will adopt inclusive institutions. In fact, the opposite can be true. Once society
throws off the shackles of an oppressive regime, such as during the Glorious Revolution
in England or the French Revolution, elites will once again emerge to fill the power
vacuum in the state. These new elites will be subject to the same incentives as the
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previous state elites so why should we expect their behavior to be any different? Only
through empowering the society will inclusive political and, subsequently, economic
institutions emerge from a revolution. Thus, I am not here disagreeing with the notion
that inclusive political and economic institutions may arise from revolution, but that they
do not necessarily arise.
Another key issue is their notion of the “virtuous cycle,” wherein inclusive
institutions reinforce themselves, the “vicious cycle,” wherein extractive institutions
reinforce themselves, and so-called “institutional drift,” wherein minor changes occur in
institutions based upon the peculiarities of their home countries. Rather than explaining
durability or minor changes in the economic institutions of particular countries in terms
of themselves, the state-society model that I posit provides a better explanation for these
observations. Where the society remains powerful in relation to the state, so-called
“virtuous cycles” will occur, and where the state dominates the society, so-called “vicious
cycles” will occur. “Institutional drift” occurs when the power relations between the state
and society are changing, and there is compromise. When there is no compromise, there
is a revolution, which falls outside of the notion of “institutional drift.” Such a shift in
the power relationship will occur slowly and give the appearance of a “drift.” Calling it a
“drift,” though, is very misleading as such shifts are typically hard fought battles, not
passive occurrences. One could say that the economic institutions in China are
“drifting,” but that would ignore the thousands of protests and political dissidents that
fight for more inclusive political and economic institutions every day.
One important observation Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) record, however, and
one that has immediate relevance to this project, is that inclusive economic institutions

20	
  

	
  

often result from inclusive political institutions (i.e. democracy). This observation gives
at least preliminary support to my theory. Democracies are as a rule more subject to
societal forces than authoritarian states because they must be elected and are, therefore,
beholden to the desires of the society that they govern (Drury, Krieckhaus, and Lusztig,
2006). Not only are democracies normatively desirable, but they also provide the
necessary framework for long-term economic growth (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu,
2008; Minier, 1998; Barro, 1996) by fostering economic development. It is important to
note here that this holds true only for those that truly have “free and fair” elections.
There are some “democracies” that hold elections, but these are generally rigged and
cannot truly be classified as elections.
A few hypotheses result from this state-society model:
H1: When the state is more powerful than the society, as is initially the case, there
will be no economic development, only wealth extraction and,
occasionally, economic growth.
H2: As power shifts from the state to the society, there will be a concurrent shift
toward economic development and an expansion of inclusive economic
institutions.
H3: Conversely, as power shifts from the society to the state, there will be a
concurrent shift towards wealth extraction and an expansion of extractive
economic institutions to the detriment of inclusive economic institutions.
This theory and, subsequently, these hypotheses imply that the initial power distribution
for all countries is a powerful state and a weak society. The political and economic
institutions are extractive. Such an arrangement is necessitated by the violent nature of
state development (Huntington, 1968). The state needs a lot of power in order to reorient
the loyalties of the people of a given territory away from the traditional nodes of loyalty,
such as the tribe, clan, or family, onto itself. As the society coalesces and begins to react
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to the extractive state institutions, it gains power relative to the state. This results in
economic development, however slowly. This is not to say that the process only
progresses in the direction of more and more inclusive institutions. Quite the contrary,
states have incentives to hang onto power and reinstate extractive institutions. Therefore,
if the state begins to regain some of its power in relation to the society, extractive
institutions will resurge. One of the best ways to ensure inclusive economic institutions,
then, is to make the state beholden to the society, as is the case in democratically
governed countries as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) observe, though this does not
necessarily have to be the case.
Moving Forward
To recap, the central concern of this project is the state-society power
relationship. As discussed earlier, the state and its society each have different and
opposing desires. The state wants to extract wealth while the society wants economic
development, here defined as the shift towards inclusive institutions so that it can enjoy
the benefits of economic growth. Thus, so long as the state enjoys enough power that
society cannot leverage against it, extractive institutions will prevail. Once the society
becomes a credible threat, however, the state has two options. It can either
accommodate, in which case there will be a gradual shift towards inclusive economic
institutions (and, likely, inclusive political institutions), or it can hold out against the
societal pressure. If the state holds out long enough, the society will revolt against it and
we will witness a revolution.
When it comes to the ability to exert power, the state has a large advantage. The
society must generally rely upon self-organization and sheer numbers to provide the
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foundation for its strength. If organized and large enough, though, the society can exert
considerable influence. The state, on the other hand, likely has large military and police
forces. It may also be able to harness its soft power to prevent the society from
effectively organizing. Fortunately, the society doesn’t need to have more power than the
state for the state to acquiesce. It just needs to become powerful enough that the state
elite’s resistance becomes too costly for the state to maintain. States generally would
rather compromise than loose complete control. If, however, the state miscalculates and
does not compromise even when the society does pose a credible threat, the consequences
could be severe.
In the next chapter, I will analyze China’s economic developmental experiences.
Doing so will help to identify salient variables for the follow-on regression analysis as
well as provide a better sense of how to measure societal and state power. Proceeding in
this manner has a couple of benefits. First, it will enable me to gain a better handle on
just how my variables manifest themselves through history. The variables that I refer to
here are state power and social power. This case study will be able to either confirm or
disconfirm the relevance of the state power measure outlined above. As mentioned
earlier, social power is a more difficult concept to measure and the case study will shed
light on the best ways to measure it. Second, the case studies will allow me to begin to
understand just what type of relationship exists between my independent and dependent
variables. The relationship described above need not necessarily be a linear relationship.
If it is not, then that will have important consequences for how I will proceed with the
regression analysis. Third, conducting case studies will also help clarify just how to best
operationalize my variables. It will answer questions such as: Should it be a dichotomous
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variable or continuous? Are there any important controls that other work has missed?
Fourth, the case studies will provide expectations for the results of the regression
analysis. Any substantial variation between the findings of the case studies and the
regression analyses will need to be subject to addition inquiry and can even point to
interesting issues for further research.
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Chapter 2
China’s Developmental Experiences
China possesses a long history of economic and political developmental
experiences. For the purposes of this study, I am interested in the time period that
extends from the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (~1368) through 1982, after Deng
Xiaoping began implementing ambitious reforms. I use the term “China” cautiously
here, though, because “China’s” form changed substantially throughout this time period
geographically and politically. Indeed, the geographic space we now know as China did
not exist until well into the 20th century after China assumed control of Tibet and
Xinjiang. Politically, the form of government transitioned from dynastic rule to
republican government to communist regime. The economic institutions in China have
likewise varied greatly throughout this time period. These long cycles between wealth
and poverty, inclusive and extractive institutions, provide an ideal setting to explore the
model outlined in Chapter One.
Analyzing China has an additional advantage. There has been considerable
debate about the relevance of the “Washington Consensus” in economic development, as
I briefly sketched in the first chapter. One of the implicit questions that Chapters Two
and Three addresses is whether or not China’s developmental path is any different than
that taken by the Western world. By first drawing conclusions from China’s
developmental path and then using them across a broad range of case, the regressions will
help determine whether or not China’s experience is generalizable. In other words, by
examining the model outlined in Chapter One in the context of China and then

25	
  

	
  

generalizing, this study will be able to tangentially speak to just how different China’s
experience is from the rest of the world.
Choosing the time period from the beginning of the Ming Dynasty until 1982 has
a number of advantages. First, choosing this time period allows me to trace both the
increase and decrease in the level of inclusiveness of China’s economic, and political,
institutions. In this way I can demonstrate how well the model holds in both directions.
Second, following China’s developmental experiences up to 1982 allows me to
investigate the reasons behind China’s shift towards market reforms that subsequently
launched its impressive economic growth. Third, taking such a macro view of history
enables me to speak to the sustainability of China’s current economic growth. Fourth,
reviewing roughly 600 years of Chinese history will speak to the endurance of the model.
If the model explains China’s development over the past centuries it will likely explain
such development into the foreseeable future. Fifth, and finally, should the model hold
for this case study (and be further confirmed, or disconfirmed, across cases in the
regression model in the next chapter) it will speak to the relevance of mainstream
economic thought in explaining China’s economic development and growth, as briefly
overviewed at the start of this study.
It would be prudent, however, to take the time now to outline a couple of
warnings. China’s history, while relatively well documented, still poses a number of
problems. Some parts of China’s history rely upon first hand accounts that introduce
issues of objectivity, while other parts are totally lacking the information that I require to
evaluate the exact strength of civil society or the development of the economic
institutions. In the first place I rely upon historians who specialize in the time period in
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question. They are well aware of the problems of historical objectivity and I defer to
them when I am unsure of my own interpretations. In the second place, I must be humble
in my conclusions. The lack of information stems from two separate issues. The first is
that no such information exists, or is yet to be discovered. The second is that there is
simply not enough room in this study to include the information. In order to get through
600 years of Chinese history, I must focus on the larger trends, which necessarily requires
a loss of detail. As such, definitive causal relationships will be all the more difficult to
uncover. As such, this chapter should be viewed more as an illustration of my model
than definitive evidence of its explanatory power. This chapter will serve to demonstrate
how the model functions and, more importantly, help to identify the best ways to measure
the strength of the society as well as the degree of economic development. This will aid
in constructing relevant regression models in the next chapter.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I begin by investigating the statesociety relationship during the Ming and Qing Dynasties with an eye to that
relationship’s impact on the economic institutions of those time periods. This will
become more difficult in the late Qing period as I must sort out the impact of the colonial
powers from the impact of the state-society relationship. I then investigate the impact of
World War II, the Chinese Civil War, and the subsequent Communist rule. All of these
events have had important and lasting influences on China’s institutions and will serve as
the foundation for my discussion of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. At the close of this
chapter, I will evaluate the findings to prepare for the next chapter’s regression analysis.
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Ming Government and Society
The Ming Dynasty lasted from 1368 until the Qing Dynasty began in 1644. The
Ming Dynasty had a very effective system of governance that consisted of an emperor,
princes, nobility, and an extensive civil service. The civil service is of special
significance, as one scholar of Chinese history puts it: “The civil service dominated state
and society to such an extent that no student of Ming history can afford to be unaware of
its workings as a largely self-defining and self-regulating body” (Hucker, 1998: 29).
During the Ming rule, the size of the civil service quadrupled from around 5,000 to more
than 20,000. Civil servants were typically well educated, some spending up to ten years
in higher education before taking the civil service examination. Over time, however,
education became merely a means for acceding to the civil service rather than for higher
learning in and of itself (Peterson, 1998). Life as a civil servant, however, brought its
own unique rewards.
Civil servants were exempt from paying taxes and did not have to work as
common laborers on state projects. Unfortunately, this did not always guarantee an easy
life, as it was not uncommon for the emperor to have civil servants flogged before the
imperial court. What resulted from this was a well-organized, large, robust, effective,
and usually obedient civil service that helped the government maintain control. Some
scholars have claimed that the civil service was unique in that it was open to anyone who
had the education to sit for the exam. While this is true, it means that only the wealthier
segments of society who could afford the education entered the civil service. In this way,
the civil service was not a way for society to leverage against the state so much as a status
symbol for its members.
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One could compare this experience to other countries’ development paths. For
example, South Korea in recent times maintained a large bureaucracy for implementing
the government’s policies. This is one of the reasons South Korea’s economy grew so
quickly starting in the 1960’s all the way into the 1990’s. True development, however,
could not occur under these circumstances. Only once the repressive state apparatus
diminished starting in the 1990’s did more inclusive economic institutions develop. India
serves as a cautionary tale should we be tempted to place too much emphasis upon the
civil service. India had a relatively effective bureaucracy, but has been unable to fulfill
its potential for economic growth and development (Kohli, 2004) as discussed in chapter
one. In the Ming Dynasty, though, it not only had a large civil service. It also had a large
military apparatus.
While Ming China’s civil service was a large component of the government, the
military was far larger – in excess of one million troops. The common soldiers were
directed by a professional officer corps that was, for all intents and purposes, subject to
the civil service (Hucker, 1998). In modern terms this meant that there was civilian
oversight of the military. It was also a very effective fighting force. That the military
was able to hold out against Jurchen invaders as well as domestic rebellions for as long as
it did at the end of the Ming Dynasty (almost 30 years) despite its financial woes and
political mismanagement is testament to its effectiveness, largely due to its organization
and training.
Though the central Ming government had an extensive and obedient civil service
and military, the towns were generally allowed to govern themselves. Much of this
stemmed from the Ming court’s inability to project equally large amounts of power
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across its entire territory. This does not mean, however, that the towns could do whatever
they wanted. Indeed, the population was sometimes made to obey through “brutal and
arbitrary punishments on the one hand and moral exhortations on the other” (Huang,
1998: 106). After the first few decades of Ming rule, however, stricter taxation was
implemented in order to pay for increased, and at times out-of-control, government
spending. It was this spending and the subsequent increases in taxation at the beginning
of the 14th century that caused popular uprisings in China. In response the Ming
government made concessions to assuage the popular anger (Huang, 1998). The biggest
concession was that the tax burden placed upon commoners was reduced and government
spending was reigned in, though palace expenditures continued to increase. What is
important to notice here is that the government acceded to the demands of the protesters.
While it cannot be confirmed beyond a doubt that the concessions granted to the
protesters stemmed solely from the government’s fear of losing power, the timing
suggests that this was so.
Even though the Ming court had to reduce its taxes, it had other means of
collecting revenue. Throughout much of China’s imperial history, the central
government maintained a salt monopoly, which was a vital resource for such things as
food preservation. This monopoly was not a single company, but existed as more of a
cartel-like arrangement whereby multiple “companies” sold salt on a non-competitive
basis. This arrangement was aided by the central government, which made it a felony for
salt from one company to be sold within the territory of another. Additionally, the Ming
government had at least two dozen other forms of tax revenue, including customs,
business tax, fishing duties, licensing Buddhist monks and Daoist priests, and mining
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operations. Unfortunately, even all of these sources could not generate the required
revenue and the Ming government eventually failed due to an inability to generate
enough revenue to continue its existence.1
As the 16th century progressed, the Ming Empire was increasingly unable to pay
its civil servants and military forces. This, in part, stemmed from the Ming government’s
inability to create a viable paper currency (Huang, 1998). These underpaid government
servants subsequently turned to less honest means of income. Examples of this practice
include influencing court decisions, supervising waterworks projects to garner bribes, and
giving and receiving non-monetary gifts in return for favorable treatment. The extent of
the corruption is evidenced in the way it was an accepted, and even highly organized,
practice within the bureaucracy. Curiously, it does not appear that these activities elicited
any major retribution from the society, at least initially.
In the broadest sense it appears as though Chinese society writ large during the
Ming Dynasty had little ability to change the status quo, though there was undoubtedly
bitterness at their meager position in life. Ming policy was particularly harsh towards the
peasantry, even considering the reduction in the tax burden. For example, about three
million people were resettled in areas that had been destroyed in the warfare that ended
the previous dynasty in order to repopulate an essentially ravished countryside. That the
peasantry’s condition had significantly worsened is also evidenced in the rapid decline in
life expectancy that began around 1500. This decline lasted well into the following Qing
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  Certainly, there were other causes of this decline, not the least of which were the
invaders from the Northeast. The point here is simply that China could not sustain its defenses
due to fiscal mismanagement. Compounding these financial woes, foreign sources of silver
began to restrict their trade with China in the years leading up to Ming China’s demise (Atwell,
1998).
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Dynasty. In the poorer provinces, the average life expectancy was cut from around 65
years in 1500 to only 46 in 1800 (Heijdra, 1998). Furthermore, commoners were largely
subjected to predatory relationships with landlords in which there was little hope for
escape. Such progress generally required extensive education – something that the
peasantry could not afford. This social reality was reinforced by the rise of a gentry class
that generally filled the jobs requiring an education, which removed any incentive for the
peasantry to become educated. Moreover, this gentry class generally abused their
position of rank for profit.
Not only did life seem to be getting progressively worse for the peasantry, they
also appear to have been able to organize to a level not seen previously (Heijdra, 1998).
This was due largely to the expansion of roads and waterways that enabled commerce
and communication over long distances (Brook, 1998). Perhaps the most ambitious
construction project of imperial China was the Grand Canal that connected various
waterways in China and enabled travel between Beijing and Suzhou, which is located just
west of Shanghai. In addition to this project, the Ming government oversaw the
construction of a number of bridges to enable road travel over rivers. These networks
provided the pathways along which people could send mail and goods. Even though
extensive travel had become a possibility, only those who could afford the expense could
travel. Thus, peasants could occasionally communicate over great distances, but
generally could not travel. Indeed, when peasants did travel, it was to travel west where
there was more land and, it was hoped, more opportunity. Such a move took peasants
away from political centers where they would have been far more of a threat to the state.
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Around the same time travel was becoming easier, books began to be published
en masse. These books and leaflets could then be circulated among a large audience.
Leaflets were often posted in public venues. Even those who were illiterate often
received the message through those who could read. Many people took advantage of this
new printing technology, such as the gentry and the government, to circulate new ideas
and propaganda (Brook, 1998). By far the largest printers, however, were those that did
so commercially as a new market for books developed. Typically, though, these
commercial printers printed copies of books that the palace already had. Thus, even with
the advent of inexpensive printing, the technology was largely unavailable to the
peasantry.
In the final analysis, the Ming government was generally strong, though it had a
limited reach. This is not to say that the Ming government did not have considerable
influence upon its society, only that it only had such influence over a small segment of
what was geographically considered China. Overall, Ming society was weak and largely
disorganized, though it did make some progress towards organizing itself. Some of this
organization began largely due to the improvements in communication and travel that
enabled a more networked society. Unfortunately, this organization never reached the
level necessary to threaten the state and cause reform. Had society during the Ming
Dynasty been strong, this would have resulted in a significant change of institutions, if
not a violent revolution. The elites were satisfied with the status quo and the society was
too busy working out a subsistence living, too disconnected and too far away to mount
any sort of resistance to the government, even though revolts did take place. As a result,
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there was no incentive for the Ming government to change its institutions and it withered
until the invading Jurchen administered the deathblow in the first half of the 17th century.
Placing Ming China in a comparative perspective is a little problematic. Most of
the development literature concerns the experiences of a multitude of countries, but only
over the past 100, maybe 200 years. The case just examined investigates China’s
developmental experiences between 400 and 600 years ago. With that in mind, though,
some important points can be gleaned. The first is that a strong state lays the foundation
for a strong society. As we have seen, China’s state began to develop its infrastructure in
order to increase its reach and efficiency. This also increased the society’s ability to
communicate, travel, and study. The Asia Tigers had a similar experience in the 20th
century. A strong central government pushed for reforms and advanced infrastructure,
mostly to the detriment of the population. All of these countries today are models of
capitalist achievement, boasting robust and generally inclusive economies. None of that
would have been possible without first laying the infrastructural foundation to strengthen
society. Development in this formulation is an inherently messy, and often violent,
process. Starting with state repression that is later thrown off by an empowered society.
In evaluating such an assertion, the discussion of Qing Dynasty and the following
Republican periods of China’s history will prove especially instructive. Towards the end
of the Qing Dynasty we will see China’s society come into its own, though with only
limited success.
The Qing Dynasty and Foreign Encroachment
China under the Qing Dynasty continued many of the trends that were already
underway during the Ming Dynasty. During the Qing, particularly in the late 1800’s and

34	
  

	
  

early 1900’s, Chinese society came into its own as I mentioned earlier. This growth in
the society’s strength is closely linked to the massive population boom during the 1700’s.
In 1700 the population totaled roughly 150 million, but by 1794 that number had swelled
to roughly 313 million. With this massive growth, the distinction between social classes
began to erode. Peasants gained some social mobility and, subsequently, had more
political relevance (Rowe, 2002). Elite groups lost their monopoly on the press and there
was an explosion of literature. In short, the peasantry became a force in politics.
With these trends, new frictions began to emerge in society as the lower classes
began demanding greater access to the privileges that historically had been reserved for
the social elites (Rowe, 2002). These new interests included economic considerations as
agriculture became increasingly commercialized. New economic freedoms enabled many
to begin occupying jobs outside of agriculture in fields like soldiering, cooking, and art.
Often, a transition to these industries required a move to an urban center. In other words,
the changing lifestyles and occupations of the peasantry caused a new economic
awareness and a geographic shift towards seats of political power in the cities.
Indeed, this time saw an explosion in China’s urban population, particularly
among the lower classes (Rowe, 2002). Residing in these urban centers brought the
lower classes into closer contact with the Qing government. Moreover, greater
commercialization and rising wages allowed the peasantry to become increasingly
involved in political life. This is evident in the increasing frequency of protest and revolt.
As we move closer to 1800, as one scholar puts it: “collective action for protest or
resistance purposes was a fact of life,” (Rowe, 2002: 556). Of particularly high
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frequency were food riots where rioters forced the government to sell food from its
granaries.
Urbanization is particularly important in larger countries. The Asian Tigers did
not have to experience such urbanization before the society became a force. Taiwan and
South Korea were small enough that a move to an urban center was relatively easy. This
is especially true for Hong Kong and Singapore where their populations were by
definition urban. Other countries have experiences similar problems with distance.
Brazil, for example, is a very large country that is having problems with economic
development, though of a slightly different nature. Distance in Brazil’s case produced a
severe handicap on the ability of the state to implement its policies as military
commanders from different regions at times decided to disregard the state’s instructions
(Kohli, 2004). In this way the state and society both have an interest in overcoming the
problem of distance. The state has the means to building the infrastructure to allow
movement that the population then takes advantage of to urbanize.
Coupled with the increasing urban populations and growing industries, fraternal
organizations emerged (Rowe, 2002; Myers and Wang, 2002). These groups organized
industries and acted much like labor unions. These organizations then pressed their
agenda with the state. Indeed, even a cursory glance at South Korea during its rapid
growth shows a state that violently repressed unions because they posed a significant
challenge to the state’s authority (Kohli, 2004). In sum, we see a much more conscious
society; a society that was not afraid to press for concessions from the government. It
was much larger and more organized than ever before. Much of this stemmed from the
increasing availability of the press as well as the higher concentration of peasants in
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commercial centers. With this social trend, we see China’s economy becoming more
inclusive as well as increasing trade and expanding markets. In short, capitalism was
beginning to flourish in China.
China’s market economy began to grow to such a size that even the Qing
government shifted from heavily regulating the economy to loosening its controls and
encouraging people to amass wealth in order to gain political allies (Myers and Wang,
2002). To do so, the government implemented a generous tax scheme and an effective
silver currency to make business transactions more convenient. These reforms worked
very well and the society responded to the government’s incentives by organizing itself to
optimize economic output (Myers and Wang, 2002). Further evidence of the positive
impact of these reforms lies in the fact that there were no significant domestic rebellions
to which the Qing government had to respond prior to the 19th century.
Before we get too carried away with the changes occurring to China’s society,
though, it is important to remember that by 1800 fully 80 percent of China’s population
still resided in the countryside and saw little of the Qing government (Fairbank, 1978a).
Nevertheless, the increasing population meant that much of China, even in the rural areas,
had become “saturated” with people to the extent that food supply had become a problem
and competition for jobs was fierce (Jones and Kuhn, 1978). In response to these
grievances, secret societies began to form and develop political agendas. Much of this
came from anti-government sentiment as China opened to foreign powers, the Qing
government became more corrupt, the monetary system came unhinged, and China was
humiliated by its defeat in the First Opium War. As a result of these failures, discontent
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spread throughout the wealthier areas around the Pearl River Delta. This posed a serious
challenge to the state just as urbanization had.
Around this time opium addiction had become a major domestic and foreign
policy issue. Initially introduced for medical purposes during the Tang Dynasty (~600~900AD), opium use had grown to epidemic proportions by the early 1800’s. By 1836
China was importing about 1,820 tons of opium each year (Wakeman, 1978). In an
attempt to eradicate the substance from its society, China waged a war with the United
Kingdom (who exported the substance to China) in order to stop opium shipments.
China lost and was subsequently humiliated and subjected to embarrassing concessions
under the treaty with the United Kingdom. Additionally, the war did nothing to stop the
flow of opium. Estimates indicate that, by 1890, China had more than 15 million opium
addicts.
The treaty system established at the end of the Opium War in 1842 ushered in an
era of political chaos in which the Dynastic rule eroded and warring factions emerged.
Eventually, this failure contributed to the Revolution of 1911 that ended the Qing
Dynasty (Fairbank, 1978b). The treaty granted the United Kingdom massive freedoms
within China and pried open China’s ports to European imports. Within this social and
political reality, the Taiping Rebellion emerged in 1850 and sparked a civil war that
killed more than 20 million people and lasted for more than a decade (Kuhn, 1978). The
Qing government would survive and regain much of the strength that it had lost during
the rebellion, though not until the 1870’s – and only with the aid of European weapons
and tactics (Liu, 1978; Liu and Smith, 1980; Kuo, 1978; Hao and Wang, 1980). This
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increased Western presence and the opening of China to Western influence would later
touch-off the Boxer Rebellion, which was a short-lived pro-Qing, anti-foreign movement.
It is important to note that as the 19th century came to a close, China’s economy
was undergoing a radical transformation. Prior to the 20th century agriculture was
China’s economy. There was little else. By 1895, however, the number of Chineseowned manufactures was on the rise. One scholar notes that “The economy of late[Qing] China was, at its given level of technology, characterized by a high degree of
commercial development,” (Feuerwerker, 1980: 40). China’s market had become
increasingly connected and trade moved rapidly along the countryside towards urban
centers. It is no accident that such changes to China’s economy occurred alongside
advances in communication and transportation technologies. For the purposes of this
study the most important consequence of this economic growth is the increasingly
market-conscious society, especially among the new merchant class (Chan, 1980).
Even as the peasantry began to gain an economic awareness, the Qing military
declined. Much of this stemmed from the regime’s financial woes. The Qing navy was
severely underfunded and could barely sustain the fleet it currently possessed, much less
modernize and expand. The army likewise began to suffer severe financial trouble as the
19th century came to a close (Liu and Smith, 1980). This was particularly problematic
during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), when China suffered an especially horrific
defeat. Thus, the Qing military not only declined during this period, but it was also
engaged in other conflicts that tied up what resources it did have.
In addition to these economic and military trends, the political atmosphere of the
Chinese society had begun to change significantly. Western political thought, most

39	
  

	
  

importantly the idea of democracy, began to penetrate deeply into China’s intellectual
classes. Aided by the development of more advanced printing technology, this new
strand of political thought found its way onto numerous political leaflets. The ultimate
goal of these intellectual reforms was to institute a democratic constitutional government.
As time went on, however, the nascent reform movement grew ever more radical in its
outlook, leading some rebels to establish their own government in Hunan province in
1897. This movement later suffered because its radical ideology caused significant
backlash and it floundered within a year (Chang, 1980). Regardless of its outcome, the
most important thing to note is that the short-lived government in Hunan constituted a
major challenge to the Qing government’s sovereignty. It was no accident that such a
challenge coincided with a sharp decline in Qing state power, specifically in its military
and legitimacy.
The end of the Hunan government was not, however, to be the end of the
reformist movement in China. In the same year the reform movement in Hunan waned, it
appeared in Beijing. The Qing government suffered from some significant political infighting between those who wanted reform and those that did not. This struggle
culminated in the “Hundred Days” of 1898 when the government sought to implement
more than one hundred military, cultural, educational, and economic reforms. The
reforms sought to help the government regain political control of an increasingly
rebellious society. Nearly all were implemented, but the increasing radicalization of the
movement once again invited retaliation from the more conservative minded members of
government (Chang, 1980). The end to the reform movement came when the empress
dowager staged a successful coup d’état. Essentially, the empress stalled the reform
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movement at a time when the government was weak and the society strong – a political
miscalculations that would have terrible consequences for the government.
Such developments point to another phenomenon occurring in China’s society –
social globalization. As I discussed above, Europeans established a strong beachhead in
China after the Opium War. This not only humiliated the Qing state, but it also caused
China’s society to come up against new ideas about economics and politics. As we shall
see this sort of international interaction only increased as time continued and played an
integral role in the 1911 Revolution. In this sense, social globalization can also be a
measure of society’s strength. It is difficult to place such a phenomenon in a comparative
perspective without going into a lot of detail, but I believe it safe to speculate that the
Asian Tiger’s developmental experiences will confirm that social globalization, and
globalization generally, play an important role in economic development. South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are all now models of international interaction. I
will take up this claim again in chapter three and for now will only explore it in the
context of China’s developmental experiences.
Revolution and Republican China
Chinese society, embarrassed by repeated defeats at the hands of foreign powers
and enlivened by a new political and economic awareness, became increasingly
nationalistic towards the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. The first real
challenge to the Qing regime occurred in 1900 when Sun Yat-Sen staged an abortive
revolution (Jansen, 1980). This growing discontent also set off a wave of reforms as the
Qing government desperately sought to maintain control over its crumbing regime.
These reforms included establishing central control over the military, financial and
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market reforms, and overtures towards constitutionalism (Ichiko, 1980). This movement
towards inclusive political institutions, unfortunately, proceeded at a slow place and was
ultimately unable to stave off the October 1911 revolution. All-too-aware of its weak
position, the Qing government frantically sought to appease the revolutionaries by
implementing the nineteen articles of the constitution.
The revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-Sen relied primarily upon the lower
class, a lesson that would not be lost on Mao Zedong during the Chinese Civil War. This
discontent was infectious and soon spread to the upper classes. In particular, students
seized upon the revolutionary fervor and the Chinese students studying in Japan became a
locus of discontent. Between 1905 and 1908, the student movement and Sun Yat-Sen’s
revolutionary movement joined forces to present a more formidable enemy to the Qing
court. The movement grew further as it developed contacts with secret societies in the
countryside, whose ranks had swelled by this period, and by 1906 uprisings were
springing up across China (Bastid-Bruguiere, 1980). Soon the revolutionaries’ discontent
spread to the military and by 1910 the Qing court’s control over the military had been
severely crippled (Gasster, 1980). This all culminated in 1911 with the birth of the
Republic of China.
The new republican government, however, would not be the end of China’s
political woes. In the words of a prominent Chinese historian, the years from 1912-1949
“were marked by civil war, revolution and invasion at the military-political level, and by
change and growth in the economic, social, intellectual and cultural spheres,” (Fairbank,
1983: 1) – it was, in a word, chaotic. New leaders emerged who, unfortunately,
epitomized the transition from the incentive structures of the society to those of the state.
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Those who once championed inclusive institutions quickly changed to promoting
extractive institutions and stagnated economic development. Early in the Republican
government, a strong leader – Yuan Shi-Kai – emerged who concentrated power in the
state. Such an authoritarian leader soon elicited a violent response from the society.
China’s economic performance from 1912 to 1949 was dismal. In areas where
the economy did not contract, it stagnated. Industry was hit particularly hard by war
between 1937 and 1945. The banking industry never fully materialized in any useful
way. Most of China’s railways were either seized or destroyed after 1912 and “…the
Chinese economy as a whole underwent no significant transformations; at best there
occurred only a ‘partial development,’” (Feuerwerker, 1983: 126). This lack of
development was initially due to the strong authoritarian government.
Indeed, most scholars of this time period stress the continuity of the political
authority of the central government, though now in a Republican form (Young, 1983).
While the revolution by definition disrupted the central government’s hold on power in
1911, by the end of 1912 Yuan Shi-Kai had risen as the clear ruler. Initially he instituted
a number of reforms designed to improve the efficiency of the government and economy.
As time continued, however, Yuan’s rule developed into a de facto dictatorship. He lost
tolerance for the restraints imposed by the provincial governments and, as a consequence,
took away their power. His methods knew no bounds as he resorted to cheating, political
maneuvering, and murder, to gain the power he desired. In a sense, Yuan had to use
these methods because his rule lacked legitimacy (Rankin et al, 1986). As Ernest Young
states: “Yuan [Shi-Kai] is remembered among Chinese for his treachery towards the
reformers in 1898, towards the [Qing] court in the 1911 Revolution, and towards the
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republic after becoming president” (1983: 237). By 1914, Yuan had removed all elected
assemblies and militarily occupied trouble provinces.
When Yuan Shi-Kai died in June 1916, warlordism swept across China. The
central government tried, and failed, to implement a constitution – mostly due to
factionalism (Nathan, 1983). Warlords rose to fill the power vacuum left by an
ineffective government. The instability is nowhere clearer than in the hundreds of armed
conflicts that occurred in China between 1916 and 1928. Furthermore, the warlords
imposed an incredibly onerous tax burden upon the territory they controlled. This burden
contributed to massive famines and widespread death. In a sense, though, this
warlordism would contribute to the social movements (most notably the Communists)
that would later unify China (Sheridan, 1983). Most importantly for this study, societal
power was crippled right along with state power. Warlords were not subject to the whims
of society in the same way the state was and, as a consequence, were under little
compulsion to reform the economy.
Under these onerous conditions, new ideologies began to take hold in Chinese
society. In the late 1910’s and early 1920’s, Marxism spread like wildfire among the
intellectuals in China who had come into increasing contact with Western ideas in
China’s urban centers (Schwartz, 1983). The message of class conflict was eagerly
consumed by the lower classes that had to live under the draconian measures imposed by
a despotic government (Furth, 1983; Ch’en, 1983). Eventually, in 1921, the Communist
Party (CCP) met for the first time. Beginning with only 130 members, the CCP grew
rapidly, reaching 60,000 by 1927. During this time, the CCP succeeded in organizing
and radicalizing the peasantry (Wilbur, 1983). This rapid growth quickly drew the ire of
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the Nationalist (GMD) government and so, in order to avoid further persecution, the CCP
began to organize an army and a government in 1927 (Ch’en, 1983). The ability of the
CCP to defend itself became paramount after the GMD defeated the warlords in 1928 and
then concentrated its attention on defeating the CCP.
In the early 1930’s three major events occurred: the economic depression arrived
in 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931 as a precursor to all-out war in 1937,
and the CCP established a full-fledged government in Jiangxi, which is located in SouthCentral China. While this was taking place, the GMD was establishing a government in
Nanjing under Chiang Kai-Shek. Once established, the GMD began to tighten its control
over its critics through assassinations and arrests (Eastman, 1986a). In 1934, the GMD
initiated a long and brutal campaign against the CCP that covered more than 6,000 miles
on foot in less than 400 days – nearly wiping out the CCP. This event, known as “The
Long March” would have a profound impact upon Chinese politics. During The Long
March, Mao Zedong rose as the leader of the Communist Party and would later become
China’s dictator (Ch’en, 1986).
Also during this time, the peasantry continued to develop the rural market
economy. By the 1930’s, in some instances, as much as half of what the peasants grew
was sold for profit (Myers, 1986). They also developed a class consciousness due to the
Communist efforts in the area. They juxtaposed themselves against the wealthier classes,
which would become an important component of Mao’s rule after 1949. This sense of
class solidarity was further strengthened during the Sino-Japanese War, which lasted
from 1937 to 1945. When the Japanese invaded, the peasants had to bear the brunt of the
onslaught of the invasion (Eastman, 1986b). By 1945, China was left with a large,
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discontent, and highly organized peasantry. The CCP offered the peasants a way to vent
their frustrations and after the end of the Sino-Japanese War they launched the Chinese
Civil War that pitted the GMD against the CCP for the ultimate control of China.
Indeed, without the Communist Party, it would have been unlikely that the
peasants would have thought to revolt. Additionally, without the peasantry, the
Communist Party would not have been powerful enough to defeat the GMD (Bianco,
1986). The literature produced during the 1920’s, 30’s, and 40’s helped to spread the
revolutionary fervor among the peasantry (Lee, 1986). This discontent was further stirred
as many urban Chinese fled the Japanese invasion by settling in the rural west. These
urbanites often abused the rural Chinese, which in turn solidified the peasantry’s distaste
for the upper classes. By 1944 the unrest in the countryside was palpable and ready to
explode at the first opportunity. Unfortunately for the GMD, this increasing unrest
coincided with the deterioration of the Nationalist army (Eastman, 1986b). Estimates
indicate that the CCP had grown from only 40,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million in 1945 (Slyke,
1986). The stage was set for power to once again change hands.
The Chinese Civil War began when Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist forces
launched a daring extermination campaign against the CCP in August 1945. At the start
of the Civil War, the GMD far outstripped the Communist forces in both quality and
quantity. Soon, though, the Nationalist government began to lose its support base as
rampant inflation caused the urban Chinese to lose confidence in the GMD’s ability to
govern. In response, the GMD initiated an aggressive economic reform campaign in
order to stabilize the economy in 1947 and 1948. These measures failed, however, to
stem the tide of popular discontent. During this time, the CCP began to counter-attack
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utilizing effective guerilla tactics that soon had the GMD forces on the defensive. By
1949, Chiang Kai-Shek’s main forces had been destroyed and the Communist forces
simply conducted mopping-up operations until the GMD sued for peace (Pepper, 1986).
Thus, by 1949, the Communists under Mao were firmly in control of China and began to
implement their own style of authoritarian government. These developments augur the
return of a powerful, centralized state.
One of the most important lessons of this portion of Chinese history is that an
efficacious state is an important factor in successful economic development. After the
1911 Revolution, economic development stagnated. This trend continued through the
warlord period and the Chinese Civil War. Development would not resume again until
well into the Communist rule. Without a state, no effective policies could be created,
much less implemented. Likewise, China under Yuan Shi-Kai and Mao Zedong, as we
shall see, had a society that was too weak or a state too strong, which prevented
beneficial developmental policies from being created. Thus, a balance must be struck
between a strong state and a strong society. Each are important in varying degrees to
economic development.
Communist China to Deng
One of the defining characteristics of Mao’s Communist China is the degree to
which the state apparatus penetrated Chinese society. When the CCP assumed control of
China it set about reunification on a scale not seen for centuries (Fairbank, 1987). To
accomplish this the CCP adopted the Soviet model of government centered on a strong
central government. Indeed, Mao often deferred to the Soviet Union on questions of
ideology – at least until 1957. The CCP initially limited its obligations, trying not to
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overextend itself, as it sought to rebuild its membership. Such pragmatism was
welcomed by much of the society, which had become severely disillusioned with the
Nationalists and its failed policies (Lardy, 1987a). In the first couple of years, the CCP
began land reform wherein land was taken from the landlords and distributed among the
peasantry. Such practices won the peasantry by helping, at least initially, to improve the
peasantry’s quality of life (Teiwes, 1987).
In order to foster economic growth, Mao Zedong implemented the first Five-Year
Plan in 1953. This first plan marked a radical break with traditional society. The plan
entailed collectivizing peasants across the country in order to increase productivity,
something at which it was particularly successful. Collectivization increased
dramatically in the second Five-Year Plan, which ran from 1958 through 1962. This
second plan ushered in what is known as the “Great Leap Forward.” It was a very
ambitious plan to push towards what was marketed as a socialist utopia. It also served
the political necessity of silencing political opponents and kept the society in line with the
Communism ideal. By 1960, the Great Leap Forward had proved to be a disaster and
was the main reason a famine swept the countryside in 1959 and 1960 that caused at least
20 million deaths (Lieberthal, 1987). This failure undermined Mao’s popularity within
the CCP.
Such disasters created a lot of discontent among the peasantry, but Mao
masterfully manipulated the population into obedience. In 1956, Mao began the
“Hundred Flowers Campaign” during which he allowed open criticism of the Communist
Party. What he had not counted on, though, was the degree to which the population
would use the opportunity to criticize the government. In order to regain control, Mao
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subsequently instituted the “Anti-Rightist Campaign” in order to purge those deemed
unfriendly to the state by appealing to the supposed ideological purity of Communism
(Teiwes, 1987). This demonstrates the way in which the CCP alleviated pressures for
reform from the society without actually giving up any power. Particularly important
was the way in which the CCP handled higher education.
The Communist party kept a strong hand on education and the intellectual class.
It vigorously promoted education and literacy, but this education had a significant Maoist
bent to it (Pepper, 1987a). For example, “productive labor” became part of the
curriculum and class background screening became required for those seeking admission
to higher education (Pepper, 1987b). Intellectuals were subject to what appear to have
been schizophrenic policies. They were first indoctrinated into Marxism and Leninism,
and then encouraged to be true to their profession – that is to publish freely. This tension
tended to have extreme consequences. For instance, intellectuals were the most
outspoken group during the “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” but then were subject to the
cruel oppression of the “Anti-Rightist Campaign” soon after – largely at the hands of the
society (Goldman, 1987a). This suppression effectively cowed the Chinese intellectual
community into towing the party line (Goldman, 1987b). The academy was a crucial
institution that the government kept a tight grip on. As we have seen previously, the
academy has an unusually strong ability to foment dissent. This makes it important for
the government, especially an unpopular one, to control it.
This became especially vital after the failures of the Great Leap Forward (GLF)
and the extreme economic decline that occurred because of it. Rather than increasing
agricultural growth, the extreme collectivization policies of the GLF slowed it. This
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contributed to the massive famine of the late 1950’s, as previously noted. Even after the
end of the famine, there was an extreme downward pressure on the living standards of the
rural population. This includes a peasantry sinking ever deeper into poverty and an
increasing mortality rate in the rural areas. As a result, much of the peasantry began to
decollectivize in defiance of the CCP’s policies (Lardy, 1987b). Unfortunately, this
would not be the end of the society’s woes, as Mao would once again try to reassert his
power in an even more forceful manner.
All of these events came to a head in the 1966 Cultural Revolution. Having
sensed his politically vulnerable position, Mao mobilized the peasantry under the banner
of Maoism to maintain his control (Schram, 1991; Harding, 1991). He accomplished this
by calling for the masses to purge China’s society of all “impure” elements, known as the
“four olds.” The four olds included “old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits”
(Pepper, 1991: 547). Unfortunately, Mao could not control these social forces once
released, and the ensuing chaos resulted in a full-scale assault on the very fabric of
Chinese society. Purges and deaths occurred on a massive scale as factionalism, fueled
by violent ideology, swept the country. Most of the violence was contained in the urban
centers, but as time went on the Cultural Revolution began to spread to the countryside.
Fortunately the rural areas were not hit as hard, but there was still significant damage to
rural life as traditional religion was attacked and ancient artifacts destroyed (Madsen,
1991).
Mao officially declared the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, but in practice
the violence and purges continued until 1977. The Cultural Revolution was designed to
maintain Mao’s handle on the CCP, but by the early 1970’s new leaders began to emerge.
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This study will not concern itself with the details of the leadership transition, but it is
enough here to say that Deng Xiaoping emerged as the de facto leader of the CCP by
1978 (MacFarquhar, 1991). Once coming to power, Deng began implementing massive
reforms to end Maoism and collectivization. These are the reforms that laid the
foundation for the massive economic growth, and even development, that we are seeing
in China today. This was largely due to the massive societal forces that had been
released during the Cultural Revolution and by the CCP before that. One historian makes
the point eloquently and is worth quoting at length here:
By the CCP’s Twelfth Congress, in 1982, the erosion of the Party’s
authority as a result of the Cultural Revolution, the subsequent moves
to restrain the arbitrary use of power, the decline in the force of
ideology, the unleashing of the peasant and the attempt to free up the
urban economy – all carried the potential for a role for the society visà-vis the state possibly greater than at any previous time when China
was united under a strong central government…Those burgeoning
social forces would finally challenge the bonds of state authority in the
[Tiananmen] demonstrations of 1989 (MacFarquhar, 1991: 401).

Deng’s reforms included major shifts in Chinese economic thought. By 1979,
China had begun allowing greater economic freedom throughout China. Bonuses for
superior performance were introduced. Special economic zones, which provided
incentives designed to attract FDI, were established along the coast. By the mid-1980’s
China had made significant progress in market reforms that have served it so well since
(Perkins, 1991; Whyte, 1991). Indeed, this is the foundation upon which China’s current
economic growth is based.
Conclusion
China’s turbulent history presents an amazing variety of societal strength, state
strength, and economic development from which I can draw conclusions. Broadly
speaking, China’s history during the Ming Dynasty consisted of a weak society and a
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weak state. Over time, the strength of both China’s society and China’s state increased.
China’s society, however, began to gain an upper hand through the population explosion,
urbanization, and subsequent organization. The society also became increasingly
involved in economic pursuits, which gave it coherence in its political objectives. A
turning point occurred after the Opium Wars that destroyed much of the state’s power
and infuriated the society. Generally speaking, as the power balance tipped in favor of
the society, the state sought to respond to its loss of power by appeasing the society.
Ultimately, appeasement failed and the last Dynasty was overthrown in 1911.
What followed was an era of chaos. First, China’s society suffered under a
dictatorship. Then it suffered under warlords, before once again suffering during the
Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. All of these factors pushed the society,
and especially the peasantry, to organize on a scale never before seen. This organization
largely benefitted the CCP, which then used this force to gain control of China in 1949.
Upon coming to power, the CCP implemented a strong central government to effectively
control the society through ideological manipulation and physical intimidation. Once
Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, and in response to the degree to which the CCP
was falling from power, he implemented massive reforms that brought a large degree of
economic development and helped to restore the CCP’s grip on power. For example,
economic planning in the 1980’s became less centralized, allowing for greater economic
freedom between provinces and even counties.
These events amply demonstrate the applicability of the model outlined in chapter
one. First, the importance of a viable state is shown through China’s experiences of
Revolution, Warlordism, and civil war in the early 20th century. Second, a strong society
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correlates well with advances in economic development. Third, the differing incentive
matrices of the state and the society is beautifully demonstrated by Yuan Shi-Kai’s
transition from a revolutionary who favored inclusiveness to a dictator that sought to
solidify his hold on power through extreme repression. This chapter will illuminate the
regression analysis of just what measures of social and state power are the most important
indicators of economic development.
China’s experience suggests a number of potential measures of societal power
that will be explored further in the next chapter. First, population density, particularly in
urban centers, matters. The population needs to be organized close to vital government
resources to have an impact. The Communist Revolution may have started in the
countryside, but it was most dangerous in major cities like Shanghai. Second, access to
communication technology and transportation matters. Without an ability to
communicate ideas, organization around a particular policy issue is nearly impossible.
Without transportation, the peasants would not have been able to see the income disparity
between the rural and urban parts of China.
Alternatively, social globalization may be posited as an appropriate measure of
social strength. Looking back over the past 150 years of Chinese history, the influence of
international pressures and ideas becomes apparent. First, Marxism traveled to China
through urban centers. Thus, as China urbanized, its society was exposed to these
revolutionary new ideas. Second, better communication and transportation technology
not only create a better-connected society, it also created a society more connected to
other societies. Third, the student movement was, and is, an important revolutionary
force. In 1911 international students in Japan helped to focus revolutionary fervor, in
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1989 students protested a Tiananmen Square, and today Chinese students continue to
protest. All of these, and other, indicators of societal strength will be developed further
in the next chapter.
This chapter also indicates that measures of the state’s power are pretty
straightforward. The times when the government felt itself losing power coincided with
the times when its military forces were severely weakened. Logically, a weak military
means that the state is less secure. This applies to the foreign as well as domestic arenas.
The military served not only to protect the state from external intruders, but also from
domestic rebellions. Thus, the state felt less powerful and the society empowered. In
order to maintain control, the government then had to implement reforms.
The case study, however, does not necessarily indicate that relative power is the
more important driving force. Absolute power could also be an explanation of economic
development. In other words, the society could be the main driving force behind
economic development regardless of state power. In China’s history examined here it
would be hard to imagine the Chinese government compromising when it did if the
society was weak – even if its military apparatus was weak as well. Such a hypothesis
does not conflict with the model outlined in chapter one. The incentives matrix for the
society and the state remain the same, but the emphasis would be upon the society’s
power rather than equally upon the state’s and the society’s power.
In the next chapter, I will explore three separate models. In the first, I investigate
the society versus state power ratio and its impact upon economic development. In the
second model, I investigate the domestic power of the society. That is to say that I
intentionally try to leave aside measures of globalization to look at how the society’s
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domestic power impacts economic development. Third, I use a measure of social
globalization to tease out the impact of the interconnectedness between societies upon
economic development. In order to compare the relative affects of each model, I will run
regression models and analyze their findings. Doing so will aid the in identifying the
appropriate interpretation of China’s history. It will also help to determine potential
paths for future research.
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Chapter 3
Generalizability
This chapter has two goals. First, it seeks to expand the generalizability of the
theory proposed in chapter one beyond the exploration in chapter two. Second, it seeks
to compare the competing interpretations briefly discussed at the end of the previous
chapter. To do this, I construct several regression models. I first outline the ways in
which I measure my dependent and independent variables. I also investigate the creation
of appropriate controls based upon the case study analyzed in chapter two as well as other
works. Finally, I run the regression models. These models analyze the proposed
relationships in a few different ways. The first model explores the impact of the society
versus state power relationship upon economic development.

The second model uses

only the measure of domestic societal power as the independent variable. The third, and
final, model analyzes how the level of social globalization a country exhibits impacts
economic development. I now proceed by exploring how to measure economic
development, as it is the common feature of all three models.
Economic Development
How I define economic development will have important consequences for the
outcome of my regression models. Fortunately, I have already explored the concept in
the previous two chapters and am now in a good position to describe exactly what I mean
by economic development. Economic development does not equal economic growth.
Economic growth involves simply the increasing size of a state’s economy. It does not
speak to the institutions, nor does it speak to the freedom of the citizens of the state to
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pursue their individual economic interests. In this study, institutions - and the freedom
of individuals therein – are crucial to understanding the economic development of a state.
This is what is meant by the shift from extractive to inclusive institutions.
Extractive economic institutions are those institutions whereby the state apparatus utilizes
its power to concentrate wealth at the top. Normal citizens, the society, are unable to
make choices regarding their own economic freedom and are not rewarded for the quality
of work that they do. A great example of this from modern history, and sketched in
chapter two, was the collectivization of the Chinese society under the Communists –
particularly in the 1950’s and 60’s. Under these policies, the peasants did not own
personal property. Everything belonged to the commune and, by extension, the state.
Anyone who refused was severely reprimanded. The peasants had little to no choice in
the types of economic activity they pursued and they were not rewarded according to
their work. The state was the main benefactor of the peasant’s economic activity.
Inclusive economic institutions are essentially the opposite of extractive economic
institutions. Inclusive economic institutions give the society the freedom to pursue
whatever type of economic activity it chooses. Of course, this is a bit of a simplification.
All states have some sort of regulatory institutions that preside over major
macroeconomic decisions. In the United States, for example, one of the most important
economic institutions is the Federal Reserve. While the Federal Reserve is supposedly
considered an independent bank in the sense that it supposedly operates independent of
the government, the chairman of the Fed is still a politically appointed position. Outside
of the financial sector, laws passed by Congress penetrate deeply into the economy.
Since the economic crisis of 2008 laws have been passed to regulate many aspects of
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banking. Furthermore, taxes levied by the state both directly and indirectly affect
economic interactions. These regulations, leaving political debate aside, are not
necessarily bad or good things. An efficacious state is a requirement of a vibrant
economy, just as much as an efficacious society. When they become particularly
onerous, though, then that signals a shift towards extractive institutions.
Economic development, then, is a shift from extractive institutions to inclusive.
Often economic development requires economic growth. In the China example outlined
in chapter two, economic growth generated revenue that the state then invested into the
state’s infrastructure. This in turn strengthened society, which later compelled economic
reform. Furthermore, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have argued, in order to sustain
economic growth states must develop inclusive economic institutions. Such claims will
have consequences for the independent and control variables to be discussed later.
To proxy the level of inclusive institutions in a country, this study utilizes 2010
data from the Economic Freedom Index (Heritage, 2013). This measure, put out by the
Heritage Foundation,1 is a composite of a number of different categories designed to
measure the “rule of law,” “limited government,” “regulatory efficiency,” and “open
markets.” For my purposes, I am most concerned with the measure of “open markets.”
In particular, I utilized the measures of investment freedom and financial freedom.
Investment freedom measures the ability of citizens and businesses to move capital both
between ventures and around geographically. Financial freedom measures the degree to
which the state owns and controls the banking system in the country. In both cases,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

I was initially concerned with using this data source due to particular partisan biases.
Fortunately, reviewing their data and the descriptions of such data indicated that these measures
were compiled using highly reliable sources, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World
Bank, and the IMF.
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higher scores indicate freer environments. I chose these measures because they best
capture the level of a country’s economic development in the sense that they measure the
degree to which the citizens can control their own economic activities free of government
intervention. The measure of economic development consists of the average of
investment and financial freedom. Finally, I scaled this measure so that the minimum
value equals zero and the maximum value equals one. I did this to aid in the
interpretation of the regression results as well as make it more suitable to compare to the
independent variable, as will become apparent at the end of the next section.
Model One: Society and State Power
One of the more difficult things to measure involves exactly how to get at societal
power. The previous two chapters point to some potentially useful measures.
Specifically, I take societal power to be the result of a number of factors that include
infrastructure, the ability to communicate, geographical proximity to political and
economic centers, as well as tertiary education. These factors appeared to have the most
impact in the case study in terms of the society being able to put pressure on the
government to institute economic reforms. The issue then becomes: how do I adapt these
measures to reflect the 21st century? The history I analyzed spanned more than 600
years. Fortunately, there are modern corollaries that can easily be substituted to
accurately measure societal strength.
As we saw in chapter two, the ability of the population to move around played an
important role in strengthening society. A major improvement in societal strength
occurred after the imperial court constructed the Grand Canal and many bridges that
facilitated travel. Today it is not so much the ability to travel on the water that is as
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important as the existence of a viable road network. Such a network enables the society
to move around. It enables the society to gather in urban centers where it can put
pressure on the government. And therein lies the key.
Earlier in the case study, I showed how peasants initially moved westward in
search of opportunity. This did nothing to pressure the government to reform. What
really mattered was urbanization. A high concentration of disgruntled peasants close to
vital economic and political centers is far more dangerous to the state than disgruntled
peasants hundreds of miles away – especially if they cannot easily travel. Thus, measures
of a country’s road networks as well as a measure of a country’s urbanization are both
important indicators of the ability of the society to leverage against the state. I gathered
the data on roads from the CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2013) and the 2010 urbanization
data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012), which is published by
the World Bank. The data on roadways is a little problematic since 2010 data is not
available for all of the countries. Here, I used 2010 data if it was available or the most
recent data if it was not. To get a sense of the level of road network development for
each country, I divide the total number of roads by the amount of territory of each given
country. This can, in particular cases, be problematic. For example, only a small fraction
of Libya is readily habitable so the people only live on a fraction of Libya’s landmass.
Thus, my measure of road density will appear lower than the reality on the ground. This
is not a major problem for two reasons: (1) this is not as much of a problem across cases
and (2) if anything, that the measure of road network density is lower than it is in
actuality will, in fact, make it harder to confirm the proposed relationship. Thus, even
though this is only one component of the measure of societal strength, the regression will
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err on the side of disproving the relationship, which will make the actual relationship
stronger than it appears in the results.
Communication is another important component of societal strength. It is this
area that has evolved the most over the past few hundred years. Modern technology
makes communication very quick and easy. Hundreds of years ago, long distance
communication involved a lot of time and expense. Communication is key because it
enables disgruntled segments of society to coordinate over great distances on a particular
issue. Today, the Internet is perhaps the most important manifestation of this ability.
Interest groups can create webpages, videos, and organize events with great ease. This
ability has only increased with the advent of social media. Thus, I utilize a measure of
Internet use get at the ability of the society to communicate with one another.
Fortunately, 210 data is readily available through the World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2012).
The final component I analyze to get at a measure of societal strength is a
measure of the level of tertiary education. The case study in chapter two showed the
potential of students and faculty in higher education to foment dissent. This was
particularly important around the revolution of 1911. Why exactly this is true is beyond
the scope of this study. It could be that college students are generally more radically
minded than the general population, have more free time relative to having to work in the
fields, or their education allows them to have a better perspective on their own economic
situation. Whatever the cause, a robust higher education system contributes to societal
power. Utilizing the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012), I collected the
measures of the percentages of the relevant age group in each country that are enrolled in
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tertiary education in 2010. This measure has an additional advantage not previously
discussed. Higher percentages indicate not only the amount of students enrolled in
tertiary education, but it also speaks to the endurance of the higher education system.
Higher numbers indicate that the system has been an institution over a longer period, over
which time it built its numbers.
Before calculating a measure of the societal power, I scaled all of the indicators
already discussed so that the maximum value equaled one. This ensured that all
indicators were given equal weight when I took the average. After taking the average of
all of the indicators for each country, I again scaled the measure of societal power so that
the maximum value equaled one. The reason for doing this is twofold. First, I allows me
to set the country with the highest societal power equal to one, which aids not only
interpreting the regression results, but also enables me to accurately compare it to state
power – a subject to which I now turn.
State power in this study is far more straightforward than societal power. State
power amounts to the military and policing capabilities of the state. This is not only true
of China’s experience, but also of South Korea, Taiwan, and other late late-developers.
These forces enable the state to keep a grip on its society. With the backing of a strong
and loyal military and police force, the state can be relatively assured of its position vis-àvis the society. Just look back at chapter two for some examples. Prior to the crumbling
of the Qing Dynasty, the imperial court twice tried to implement sweeping reforms to
stave off utter ruin. These last ditch efforts occurred when it became readily apparent
that the state no longer had a reliable and effective military force. Fortunately, military
figures for 2010 are very easy to find in the World Development Indicators (World Bank,
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2012). Data on police forces around the world in 2010, however, were harder to find.
For this data I relied upon the International Statistics on Crime and Justice (UN, 2013)
and Interpol (2013). I was not able to find 2010 data in every case, and where I could not
I utilized the most recent data available. I summed the number of police and the number
of military to get a sense of the total raw number of military and police forces of each
country. Next, I divided this raw number of the population of each country to get at just
how large the state forces were relative to the total population. Finally, I scaled these
numbers so that the maximum equals one. I did this for the same reason I scaled the
society measure the same way. It enables me to more easily interpret the regression
results and create the required ratio with societal power.
It is this ratio that constitutes the independent variable for Model One. The
independent variable of this study has always been the power relationship between the
society and the state. To capture this, I divided the measure of societal power by the
measure of state power. I then scale this number so that the lowest value equals zero and
the highest equals one. Thus, scores closer to one indicate a relatively stronger society,
while scores closer to zero indicate a relatively stronger state.
Model Two: Social Development
The second model I explore concerns only the impact of the level of social
development upon economic development. The usefulness of this model is that it enables
me to compare domestic sources of societal power to the model that concerns social
globalization, which I will argue below is an international source of power that the
society possesses. My measure of social development flows easily from the measure
used in model one. I utilize the same measures of social power as in model one, except
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that here I do not divide this social power by state power. I also scale social power from
zero to one, rather than simply scaling so that the maximum value equals one. I do this
for two reasons. The first is that starting with zero makes the intercept meaningful, as its
value is equivalent to the value of the country with the lowest social development. The
second reason is that this measure is not a ratio. Before, setting the denominator so that
the minimum value equaled zero would artificially create an undefined observation.
Since the denominator – state power – was scaled in this way I had to scale the numerator
in a similar fashion to ensure that they were given equal weight. Without the risk of a
zero in the denominator, I can scale this measure from zero to one to aid interpretation as
indicated above.
Model Three: Social Globalization
The third model explores the impact of social globalization upon economic
development. I do this for a couple of reasons. The first is that three of the measures
used to measure social development can also be viewed in light of their globalizing
impact. Tertiary education may be a place where the society develops a revolutionary
ideology, but the reason for this is different than the one posited in model one. In model
one, I speculated that the impact of higher education itself was revolutionary or that those
who attended institutions of higher education were more disposed to revolutionary
activity. An alternative to these interpretations, however, may be that higher education
provides a global perspective. A society that transitions from basic subsistence
agricultural practices to being able to attend college certainly gains such a perspective.
Rather than concentrating on the immediate and proximate, horizons are expanded.
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Additionally, students may travel abroad to higher education, bringing with them new
ideas and customs.
Urbanization likewise has an alternative, global interpretation. In model one, I
posited that urbanization serves as a proxy for how close society lives and works –and
protests – to economic and political centers. An alternative explanation, however, is that
cities provide foci of globalization. Colleges and other higher education institutions tend
to concentrate in cities, foreign visitors are attracted to cities, as are international
businesses and foreign politicians. Thus, the larger the portion of society that lives in
urban areas, the greater the exposure to international ideas and customs, which in turn
expose the society to different forms of governance and economics.
The Internet likewise has domestic and international aspects. In model one, the
domestic aspects are emphasized, but the international aspects are also worth noting. The
Internet spans not only across countries, but between them as well. People are able to
communicate via social media, Skype, Internet phone, and e-mail – to only name a few.
Now, people do not have to be in urban centers to be exposed to new ideas and ways of
doing things. Globalization can now reach into everyone’s homes via the Internet. Thus,
Internet usage is also an important measure of globalization. The question then becomes:
how best to measure social globalization?
Following the lead of de Soysa and Vadlamannati (2011), I utilize the KOF
(Dreher, 2006; Dreher, Gaston, & Matrtens, 2008) globalization index for the year 2010.
This index comprehensively measures globalization under three separate categories:
economic, political, and social. In creating this particular measure, I am most interested
in KOF’s measure of social globalization. Social globalization is made of up three
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separate sub-categories. The first sub-category measures international interpersonal
contact by utilizing measures of telephone traffic, monetary transfers, tourism, the level
of foreign people living in-country, and letters mailed internationally. The second subcategory measures “information flow” between countries using measures of Internet users
as well as the level of TV and newspaper subscription. Finally, the third subcategory
measures “cultural proximity” by using measures of the number of McDonald’s and
Ikea’s in addition to the level of international book trade. All of the three sub-categories
are given roughly the same weight when calculating the final measure of social
globalization. All of the measures outlined here capture an important aspect of social
globalization in the modern era. Finally, this measure was scaled from zero to one to aid
interpretation.
Controls
This study utilizes five controls in order to more accurately capture the relevance
of each of the independent variables outlined above. Each will now be briefly discussed
in turn. The first two controls seek to control for the affect of other economic
explanation of economic development. The first control measures economic growth in
2010 of each country as a percentage of GDP. The logic behind this control is that as a
country grows it may develop more modern institutions. The second control in this
group seeks to control for the economic globalization of a country. Once again, I turn to
the KOF index of globalization to create this measure. Fortunately, KOF already
provides an adequate measure of economic globalization, which includes international
trade, financial investments, as well as trade restrictions imposed by the country in
question. The idea here is that countries that trade with one another may actually
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influence each other through policy diffusion (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Additionally,
countries may withhold trade to punish the target country for lack of economic
development. This process produces incentives whereby states seeking to attract trade,
and FDI for that matter, reform their political and economic institutions. This is
particularly important in light of evident that state will compete with one another to
attracted foreign investment (Elkins et al, 2006).
The second group of controls seeks to control for political phenomena.
Throughout this paper, I have posited that political and economic reform are separate, if
closely related, phenomena. Thus, I include both a measure of political globalization and
a measure of regime type. To measure political globalization, I once again rely upon
2010 data from the KOF index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher, Gaston, &
Matrtens, 2008). This index measures political globalization as a function of diplomatic
interaction. Here, just as in the economic and social realms, I would posit that political
policies have a chance to diffuse across borders. For the regime type measure, I utilize
the Polity IV 2010 data (Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers, 2011), which create a score based
upon the democratic and authoritarian characteristics of each country. One final control
measures the human rights practices of each country since de Soysa and Vadlamannati
(2011) have found a strong connection between globalization and human rights practices.
In order to measure this, I rely upon 2010 data from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset
published by Cingranelli and Richards (2010). In particular I use the measure of
worker’s rights in each country, as this part of the dataset is most relevant to my
investigation.
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Finally, I scaled all of the control variables from zero to one to aid interpretation.
The results from these regression models are displayed in Table 4. The first three
columns present the results using only the economic control variables and the second
three columns present the results using all of the control variables described above. The
last row indicates the number of countries involved in each analysis.
Results and Analysis
The models present evidence to support the globalization thesis as shown in Table
4. There is little evidence to suggest that the society/state power ratio as presented here
has much bearing upon economic development, at least as I defined it here. The key
variable in model one has little significance. Indeed, once all of the controls are taken
into account the effect of the society/state power ratio is statistically insignificant. Taken
in the context of model two, it appears that the state power’s effect, if any, is to make the
model statistically insignificant. Model two only uses the measure of social power that
was developed for model one. As you can see, once state power is dropped from the
equation, the model becomes more significant. However, once all of the control variables
are accounted for, this model becomes statistically insignificant as well.
Models one and two have only accounted for domestic sources of social power.
Model three utilizes a measure of the international sources of social power. As you can
see, model three remains statistically significant even after all of the control variables are
taken into account, which supports the notion that international societal connections play
an important role in economic development. While the regression models examined here
are limited in terms of speaking to causality it does enable me to say two things. First,
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Table 4:
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** indicates p < .01, ** indicates p < .05, * indicates p < .1

Society/State
Ratio

Economic
Development
(Model 1)
.1257*
(.0677)

Economic
Development
(Model 2)

Economic
Development
(Model 3)

Economic
Development
(Model 1)
-.0377
(.0865)

.2668**
(.1044)

Social
Development

Economic
Development
(Model 2)

.2020
(.1412)
.2952***
(.0747)

Social
Globalization

Economic
Development
(Model 3)

.2133**
(.0876)

-.1755
(.1591)

-.1651
(.1318)

-.0868
(.0935)

-.1879
(.1450)

-.1827
(.1184)

-.1009
(.0872)

.7456***
(.1540)

.4699***
(.1559)

.3965***
(.1156)

.5473***
(.1399)

.3021*
(.1613)

.3213***
(.1181)

.0856
(.1095)

-.0036
(.1007)

.0283
(.0817)

Regime Type

.1172
(.1208)

.1982**
(.0817)

.1641**
(.0641)

Worker’s Rights

.1931**
(.0812)

.1136*
(.0575)

.1043**
(.0477)

Economic
Growth
Economic
Globalization
Political
Globalization

Constant

.1905
(.1675)

.2281**
(.1148)

.2549***
(.0707)

.1439
(.1740)

.2368*
(.1420)

.1630*
(.0940)

N

74

95

130

71

91

119
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social power is relatively more important than state power in terms of its effect on
promoting or suppressing economic development. And second, international sources of
social power matter more than domestic sources, which may matter very little in this
process.
Such a claim does not invalidate the model proposed in chapter one. The main
claim that chapter one tried to make is that understanding the incentive matrices of the
society and the state as well as their relative power relationship helps to explain economic
development. It then explored potential sources of domestic and, briefly, international
power for the society in addition to the sources of state power. This chapter places the
emphasis squarely upon the international sources of social power. The ability of the
society to access and exchange information internationally has a profound affect on
whether or not that state develops. The mechanism that drives this process lies in the
alternative conclusion I examined at the end of chapter two, but is worth working through
in a little more detail below in the conclusion of this study.
China In Context
In analyzing China’s developmental experiences it becomes clear that the state’s
drive for economic growth sows the seeds for a more powerful society and, as a
consequence, economic development. This is particularly true for “late developers” like
China. In the later half of the Qing Dynasty, China developed the infrastructure that
allowed the society to travel and communicate. Additionally, foreign powers pried open
China and began trading – in ideas as well as goods and services. Marxism was
introduced from abroad. Chinese students began to study in Japan, which also had
considerable European influences. Discontent at the inadequacies of the Qing court
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fomented. This discontent led to the Chinese Revolution of 1911 that overthrew the Qing
Dynasty and ushered in an era of chaos.
What is interesting, however, is that the growing discontent coincided with
halting attempts at economic, as well as social and political, reforms. The government
tried to maintain its grip on power, though it eventually failed. As we can see from
chapter two, China’s drive to extract wealth led to the creation of the infrastructure that
aided social globalization. This, in addition to the presence of foreign influence, created
a mobilized society. This mobilized society would not only revolt in 1911, but also in
1949 and it continues to this day. China is now a very globalized society, particularly
since its economy has taken off in the 1980’s. Indeed, China’s society revolts often. One
estimate indicates the 180,000 small-scale revolts took place in 2010 (Jacobs, 2011). The
Chinese government allows such revolts for now. In fact, such small-scale protests may
actually be good for the government (Lorentzen, 2010). Should they coalesce into a
larger movement, though, such mass protests could become a real – and bloody –
political problem (Platt, 2012). But it is precisely this coalescence that will strengthen
society to the point that it can begin to effect more sweeping economic and political
reforms.
Conclusion
As mention above, the findings presented in this chapter support the model
constructed in chapter one. So long as society maintains its strength, the inclusive
economic institutions are secure. If, however, the state becomes too strong, such as
during China’s “Republican” period, extractive institutions may reemerge. This occurs
despite the level of social globalization a society may have. This explains why China’s
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society lost the inclusive institutions that it had initially sought in 1911. Such an
occurrence warns against placing too much emphasis upon either state or societal power.
A state that is efficacious is a prerequisite for economic growth and subsequent
development. Societal power grows within this context and is the more proximate cause
of economic development. Social power, however, can become irrelevant if the state is
able to regain and concentrate its power through coercive means.
The results of this study should be viewed only as a modest look at a very
complex process. All of the developmental processes examined here are closely
intertwined. This presents some interesting challenges when developing more rigorous
regression models. Previous studies of economic development have typically been
qualitative in nature or have defined economic development more in terms of economic
growth. While economic growth is certainly an important source of later economic
development, it is not the most proximate cause. Social globalization is an important
component in making the state develop the required inclusive institutions for continued
economic growth.
An interesting implication of this study as a whole, however, is that wealth
extraction contains within it the seeds of its own demise. Taking a look once again at
China, it becomes apparent that the infrastructure created by the state to improve its own
administration enabled the society to develop. It built roads and waterways, routes that
the society then used to its advantage. Communication technology, among other
improvements, developed and enabled international communication, just as foreign
influence began to enter into China. These examples illustrate the ways in which the
state utilized gains from economic growth through extractive institutions to reinvest in
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the country with the intent of extracting more wealth. In response to these changes,
China’s society and societies generally are able to strengthen and begin to assert
themselves. This then contributes to economic development and helps ensure continued
economic growth.
From this study come a number of suggestions for future research. First, while
this study has been situated in a comparative perspective vis-à-vis previous research,
other case studies should be conducted to explicitly explore the model postulated in
chapter one. Second, this model can be further refined utilizing game theory to more
formally define the assumptions and the conclusions of the model. While what I have
outlined here has been sufficient for this study, more explicit renderings of the model will
help to refine the empirical portions of the study. Third, panel data would greatly
improve the validity of the findings shown in this chapter. The regression models used
only cross-sectional data, which was sufficient for the purposes here, but further
refinement of this theory will require more extensive data. Fourth, follow-on regression
analyses should further develop controls for use. Given the inclusive nature of
globalization and development, appropriate control variables need to be carefully
constructed. Sixth, and finally, this model can be applied to other areas of development,
such as political development. Each of these different possible avenues of research will
aid our understanding of development and shed light on some of the more interesting
questions in comparative politics.
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